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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
TA/-P the p l^iC'. , •; ike, . .;.... .i0w , - Pendant su puntru of a 
reasonal . ,. . criminal activity? 
(diiuiiiitii uf Raoicw I "'I liidl court's decision to grant or deny a motion :o 
sijI!p(-,"«•;«; is a mixed question of law and fact, Tim;1 court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal 
standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 11,103 P.3d 699. The court's 
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 
94, t i l , 100 P.3d 1222. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After police discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on his 
person during an investigatory detention, Defendant was charged with possession 
of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone and possession of drug paraphernalia in a 
drug-free zone. R. 2-1. After holding a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound 
Defendant over to stand trial on both counts. R. 64-63. Defendant thereafter moved 
to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of his investigatory detention, 
arguing that the detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. R. 79-70. 
The trial court denied the motion. R. 89-88. Following a one-day trial, a jury 
convicted Defendant of both counts as charged. R. 148,155-53,223. Defendant was 
thereafter sentenced to concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen years for 
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possession of methamphetamine and 365 days for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
R. 218-16. Defendant timely appealed. R. 220-19. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On August 13,2005, "a suicidal male with a g u n . . . had blocked traffic" on 
500 West Street in Provo, in the area of 1200 North-just south of the 500 West-
Bulldog Boulevard/Columbia Lane intersection. See R. 221:5,13; accord R. 223:21-
22.2 Police officers had set up a perimeter around the area, blocking traffic on 500 
West from 1230 North (Bulldog Blvd/Columbia Ln), to "some distance south," at 
900 North. R. 5,13-15; accord R. 223:29 Responding to assist, Detective Troy Beebe 
of the Utah County Major Crimes Unit pulled into a 7-Eleven parking lot from 
Columbia Lane—"less than half a block" from the 500 West perimeter. R. 221:5-6, 
1
 As a general rule, an appellate court may affirm, but not reverse, a ruling on 
a motion to suppress based on evidence adduced at trial. See United States v. Basey, 
816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[i]n sustaining the denial of a 
motion to suppress, th[e] Court may consider not only the evidence from the 
suppression hearing but also evidence presented during the trial"); see also, United 
States Moran, 503 F.3d 1135,1139-40 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming suppression ruling 
based on evidence introduced at the suppression hearing and at trial), cert, denied, 76 
USLW 3608 (May 12, 2008). Accordingly, the Statement of Facts relies upon the 
evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, but also some evidence from trial that 
clarifies suppression hearing testimony. The facts are recited "'in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination/" See State v. Mogen, 2002 UT App 235, f 
16,52 P.3d 462 (quoting State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655,657 (Utah App. 1996)). 
2
 The suppression hearing transcript identifies August 30,2005 as the date of 
the incident. R. 221: 5. That date, however, appears to be a transcription error 
inasmuch as both the Information and the trial transcript identify the date as August 
13,2005. See R. 2; R. 223: 21. 
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13. The 7-Eleven was located across a parking area just west of a Check 
City/Quiznos building, located on the corner of Columbia Lane and 500 West. R. 
221:14,16; accord R. 223: 22. Numerous police officers were positioned east of the 
back parking area of the 7-Eleven, apparently just south of the Check City/Quiznos 
building. See R. 221: 6,19. Detective Beebe, who was driving an unmarked Dodge 
Dakota pickup truck, was dressed in plain clothes and wearing a necklace with a 
police badge. R. 221: 7,17,19. 
When Detective Beebe pulled into the parking area between the 7-Eleven and 
the Check City/Quiznos building, he saw Defendant "crouched down" at the back 
corner of the 7-Eleven. R. 221: 6,16. He observed Defendant "looking eastward 
towards where the police officers and commotion was." R. 223:22. Detective Beebe 
proceeded south "toward the backside of 7-Eleven," driving between the 7-Eleven 
to the west and the Check City/Quiznos building to the east. See R. 221: 6. As he 
did so, Defendant walked, "crouched down," towards Detective Beebe's truck and 
then walked along side the moving truck, "using [it] as a shield to block him from 
view of [the police officers positioned] to the east." R. 221:16-17, 6. Defendant 
continued to "look[ ] over the backside of [the] pickup truck at the incident that was 
occurring on 500 West." R. 221: 6-7. Detective Beebe also noticed that Defendant 
"looked nervous" and had sores on his face, both indicators of methamphetamine 
use. R. 221: 6-7,9-11. 
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Detective Beebe then "stopped abruptly/7 just short of a dumpster behind the 
7-Eleven. R. 221:7,16. When he did so, Defendant fled the area: he "ran westbound 
behind 7-Eleven towards [a] U-Haul" lot to the west and disappeared. R. 221:7,17. 
Detective Beebe considered Defendant's behavior to be "very suspicious." R. 221:7. 
He suspected that Defendant might be "a part of the incident" involving the suicidal 
male, that he "had burglarized a store," or that he had committed some other crime. 
R. 221: 8. Detective Beebe got out of his truck, telephoned dispatch to request 
backup, told Defendant to stop, and gave chase. R. 221: 7-8,19. When Detective 
Beebe ran to the U-Haul lot, Defendant came out from "behind a [U-Haul] trailer." 
R. 221:8. Detective Beebe asked to see Defendant's hands and identified himself as 
a police officer. R. 221: 8. When asked what he was doing, Defendant explained 
that he was trying to take photographs of the incident. R. 221: 8. 
In speaking with Defendant, Detective Beebe "noticed that [Defendant's] 
speech was fast and repetitive, [and]. . . that his pupils. . . appeared to be dilated," 
even though it was a bright and sunny day. R. 221:9. He observed the open sores 
on Defendant's face, as well as open sores on Defendant's arms. R. 221: 9. 
Moreover, he noticed that Defendant was unable to stand still, despite Detective 
Beebe's request that he do so. R. 221:10. As a certified drug recognition expert, 
Detective Beebe recognized these characteristics as indicative of methamphetamine 
use. R. 221:9-11. At trial, Detective Beebe explained that "[t]he chemicals that are 
5 
used to manufacture methamphetamine will often leach out through the skin 
causing sores." R. 221: 9. He also explained that because methamphetamine is a 
stimulant that elevates the nervous system, people on methamphetamine "have a 
very hard time holding still." R. 221:10. 
Detective Beebe asked Defendant if he had been using methamphetamine. R. 
221:10. Defendant admitted that he had used the drug within the last four hours. 
R. 221:10-11. When asked if he had any methamphetamine in his bag, Defendant 
again admitted that he did, but said that it belonged to a friend. R. 221: 10. At 
Detective Beebe's request, Defendant retrieved the methamphetamine from the bag. 
R. 221:10-12. Detective Beebe also confiscated various drug paraphernalia from the 
bag. R. 221:10-11.3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Detective Beebe had a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, justifying an 
investigatory stop. Defendant (1) was sneaking around the immediate vicinity of an 
ongoing incident involving an armed and suicidal male, (2) used the detective's 
unmarked truck as a shield from police detection while it proceeded through a 
nearby parking lot, and (3) fled and disappeared into an adjacent U-Haul parking 
lot when the truck suddenly stopped. 
3
 The U-Haul location where Defendant was stopped was within 1000 feet of a 
park. R. 221:12. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE OFFICER'S INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF DEFENDANT 
WAS SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY 
The Fourth Amendment allows a police officer to stop and briefly detain a 
person for investigative purposes if the officer "observes unusual conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot/' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30 (1968). "The officer, of course, must be 
able to articulate more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch/ 
The Fourth Amendment requires 'some minimal level of objective justification' for 
making the stop." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 27, and INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)). A stop is justified if the 
officer can identify "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts," support a reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity 
may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 30; accord State v. Kohl, 2002 UT 35,111, 999 
P.3d 7. 
When determining the validity of a stop, the Court "must view the articulable 
facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them 
in isolation." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,114,78 P.3d 590; accord Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
at 8 (requiring review of "the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture"); 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (cautioning against the use a "divide-and-conquer" approach 
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that considers each fact in isolation and discounts each fact "that [is] by itself readily 
susceptible to an innocent explanation"). Moreover, the facts must "be judged 
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment 
of the seizure . . . 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the 
[seizure] was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. This objective analysis includes 
consideration of "the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer" 
based on his or her experience and specialized training--inferences "that 'might 
well elude an untrained person/" Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 273 (citation omitted); 
accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 14, 78 P.3d 590. 
"Although an officer's reliance on a mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify a 
stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for 
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the 
evidence standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,274 (2002). Accordingly, 
"[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . .need not rule out the 
possibility of innocent conduct." Id. at 277. Instead, courts "must . . . 'judge the 
officer's conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience a n d . . . 
accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and 
suspicious actions/" State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, | 11,112 P.3d 507 (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262,1268 (10th Cir. 2001)). In sum, reasonable 
suspicion "'does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before 
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the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain 
common-sense conclusions about human behavior;... [law enforcement officers] 
are permitted to do the same " Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 
418). 
Applying the totality of the circumstances standard to this case, the facts 
known to Detective Beebe at the time of the stop, "together with [the] rational 
inferences from those facts/' were more than sufficient to support a reasonable 
suspicion that Defendant may be involved with the ongoing incident. Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21. Defendant was in the immediate vicinity of "a major incident," involving 
an armed man who had blocked off a portion of a street. R. 221:5-6. Police officers 
surrounded the area, "negotiators were present," and "a SWAT team . . . was on 
standby." R. 221: 6. When Detective Beebe pulled into a nearby 7-Eleven parking 
lot, he observed Defendant crouched down at the back corner of the 7-Eleven, 
looking towards the commotion and the responding officers. R. 221: 6,16; R. 223: 
22. Without more, Detective Beebe did not have a basis to make a stop. But he had 
much more. 
As Detective Beebe drove his truck through the parking lot between the 7-
Eleven and the Check City/Quiznos building, Defendant—still crouching down— 
approached the truck and then walked along its side as it proceeded south towards 
the back of the 7-Eleven. R. 221:6,16-17. Detective Beebe observed that Defendant 
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was "using [the truck] as a shield to block him from view of [the police officers 
positioned] to the east" and that he continued to eye "the incident that was 
occurring on 500 West/' R. 221: 6-7,17. Detective Beebe also saw that Defendant 
"looked nervous." R. 221: 7. Then, when Detective Beebe stopped his truck, 
Defendant fled the scene: he ran away, disappearing into an adjacent U-Haul 
parking lot just west of the 7-11 parking lot. R. 221:7,16-17. These added facts were 
more than sufficient to "'warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that 
[an investigatory detention] was appropriate." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citation 
omitted). As observed by Detective Beebe, the facts raised a suspicion that 
Defendant may have been "a part of the incident," or perhaps, that "he had 
burglarized a store" or "committed [another] crime." R. 221: 8.4 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 
(2000), is dispositive. In that case, a caravan of four police vehicles occupied by 
police officers entered an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Id. at 121. 
4
 Quoting State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990), Defendant 
contends that an officer "'must be able to articulate what it is about [the] facts which 
leads to an inference of criminal activity'" and that "'[i]f the officer fails or is unable 
to do so, his suspicion is classified as a here "hunch" rather than articulable 
suspicion/" Aplt. Brf. at 12. Although Detective Beebe did so here, Defendant's 
assertion is not entirely accurate. While officers may be required to explain the 
inferences they made based on their specialized training and experience, the Utah 
Supreme Court has made it clear that the Fourth Amendment does not generally 
require that an officer "connect[ ] his [or her] own testimonial dots." MarUand, 2005 
UT26,atTfl9. 
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When Wardlow spotted the officers, he fled the scene. Id. The United States 
Supreme Court held that Wardlow's "presence in the area of heavy narcotic 
trafficking," together with his "unprovoked flight upon noticing the police/' were 
sxifficient to establish reasonable suspicion warranting an investigatory stop. Id. at 
124-26. State courts have likewise so concluded. See, e.g., State v. Honeycutt, — So.2d 
- , 2008 WL 2190906 (La. App. May 27, 2008); Ransom v. State, 521 S.E.2d 430,433 
(Ga. App. 1999); Wilson v. State, 670 N.E.2d 27,29-31 (Ind. App. 1996). 
As in Wardlow, Defendant actively tried to evade detection by the police. 
Unlike Wardlow, he was not in a high crime area. But more significantly, he was in 
the immediate vicinity of an area where there was a major, and ongoing, incident 
involving an armed man. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 139 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that dissenters would have voted to affirm 
based on evasion had the officers been "responding to a[ ] call or report of 
suspicious activity in the area"). Moreover, Detective Beebe could tell that 
Defendant was visibly nervous, a fact not present in Wardlow. In sum, the facts in 
this case are more compelling than those in Wardlow. Moreover, Indeed, the facts 
are more compelling than those in several other cases where the investigatory stop 
was upheld. 
Defendant makes much of the fact that he was outside the perimeter 
cordoned off by police. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-15. However, he was very close (less 
11 
than a half block away), his attention was fixed on the incident and on the police 
officers positioned at the perimeter, and he was actively evading detection by police. 
Then, when the truck he was using as a shield suddenly stopped, he fled. Under 
these circumstances, ordinary common sense suggests that Defendant either was 
involved with the armed man or was attempting to position himself in a place he 
was not permitted to go. Otherwise, he would not have been hiding from the police 
or have fled from their site. Under these circumstances, Detective Beebe would 
have been derelict in his duty had he not stopped Defendant to investigate his 
behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted June ^L 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
ssistant Attorney Genera 
Counsel for Appellee 
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